Abstract

This Appendix contains excerpts from the U.S. code of statutes relating to competition outside of the Clayton and Sherman Acts.

Abstract

This Appendix contains descriptions of the antitrust laws of each state, with relevant statutory citations and some brief excerpts of more interesting provisions or provisions with unusual language. States that align the interpretation of their antitrust laws to federal law are marked with an asterisk.

Abstract

It is always an appropriate time to reevaluate, reexamine, and question the optimal scope and shape of our antitrust institutions. For example, the United States is peculiar in having two distinct antitrust enforcement agencies. More peculiar still, the agencies have both common and unique functions. For example, both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) review mergers pursuant to Section 7 of the Clayton Act and enforce Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act through civil actions. At the same time, the Division alone is responsible for criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act, and the FTC alone enforces the Clayton Act provisions that prohibit tying and unfair methods of competition. Layered atop the peculiar dual jurisdiction of the FTC and DOJ at the federal level is a remarkably complex and decentralized system of competition enforcement authority distributed among myriad federal sectoral regulators, state attorneys general, and private litigants.

This article asks whether the current distribution of competition functions in the U.S. can be improved by some reorganization or other reform. We answer in the affirmative and propose several changes — perhaps the most significant being consolidating the competition functions of the FTC into the Antitrust Division. We also propose stripping the Federal Communications Commission of authority independently to review mergers, as the Congress did with regard to the Department of Transportation in view of its similarly poor performance reviewing airline mergers. Our more general proposals regarding the authority of sectoral regulators over competition should not be overlooked, however; it would do much good and has little or no downside.

Read at SSRN.

Thank you, Victoria, for the invitation to respond to Mr. Coscelli and his proposal for a legislatively founded Digital Markets Unit. Mr. Coscelli is one of the most talented, successful, and creative heads a competition agency has ever had. In the case of the DMU [ed., Digital Markets Unit], however, I think he has let hope triumph over experience and prudence. This is often the case with proposals for governmental reform: Indeed, it has a name, the Nirvana Fallacy, which comes from comparing the imperfectly functioning marketplace with the perfectly functioning government agency. Everything we know about the regulation of competition tells us the unintended consequences may dwarf the intended benefits and the result may be a less, not more, competitive economy. The precautionary principle counsels skepticism about such a major and inherently risky intervention.

Read the full piece here.

In the brave new world contemplated by the advocates of government policies informed by behavioral law and economics, many more aspects of each individual’s life will be regulated, or more stringently regulated, than at present.  Within the legal academy, the growth of the behavioral law and economics movement has been dramatic.  Surveying all legal publications from 1980 through 1984 reveals that only a single article made mention of the phrase “behavioral economics.”  In 2005 through 2009, however, there were 917 such articles.  What, we must ask, accounts for the great and increasing attraction of the subject to legal academics?

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The behavioral economics research agenda is an ambitious one for several reasons.  The first reason is that behavioral economics requires a theory “true” preferences aside from – and in opposition to — the “revealed” preferences of the decision maker.  A second reason is that while collecting and documenting individual biases in an ad hoc fashion can generate interesting results, policy relevance requires an integrative theory of errors that can predict the sufficient and necessary conditions under which cognitive biases will hamper the decision-making of economic agents.  A third is not unique to behavioral economics but is nonetheless significant: demonstrating that behavioral economics improves predictive power.  The core methodological commitment of the behavioral economics enterprise — as with economics generally at least since Friedman (1953) —  is an empirical one: predictive power.  Indeed, no less than  Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have described the behavioralist research program as the economic analysis of law “with a higher R-squared,” that is, “a greater power to explain the observed data.”

Read the full piece here.